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WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW
A witness should give responsive answers to questions of counsel,
and answers that are not responsive may be stricken on motion of
the examining party especially if the unresponsive answer contains
inadmissible evidence. Unresponsive answers, or those that are
responsive but broader than the question, should not be viewed as
the responsibility of the questioner. On the other hand, a
responsive answer, one that is reasonably within the scope of the
question, even though prejudicial, should not be stricken as
unresponsive. 9
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Interrogating a Suspect
The decision in State v. Farley9 confronted the issue of effectively
invoking Miranda rights. Justice Cleckley held that "[t]o assert the Miranda right
to terminate police interrogation, the words or conduct must be explicitly clear that
the suspect wishes to terminate all questioning and not merely a desire not to
comment on or answer a particular question." ' Farley creates a new test for trial
courts to use in determining whether a confession is valid. In overruling precedent,
Justice Cleckley wrote in Farley that
[r]epresentations or promises made to a defendant by one in
authority do not necessarily invalidate a subsequent confession. In
determining the voluntariness of a confession, the trial court must
assess the totality of all the surrounding circumstances. No one
factor is determinative. To the extent that State v. Parsons is
inconsistent with this standard, it is overruled.92
In State v. Bradshaw,' Justice Cleckley further refined the focus trial courts
must have in evaluating a confession. Bradshaw held that "[w]hen evaluating the
voluntariness of a confession, a determination must be made as to whether the
89 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
90 452 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1994).
91 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
92 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7 (citation omitted).
93 457 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1995).
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defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights and whether
the confession was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by
its maker.
9 4
Bradshaw also addressed invocation of Miranda rights outside the context
of custodial interrogation. The opinion initially held, "[t]o the extent that any of our
prior cases could be read to allow a defendant to invoke his Miranda rights outside
the context of custodial interrogation, the decisions are no longer of precedential
value." 5 Justice Cleckley went on to hold that "[w]here police have given Miranda
warnings outside the context of custodial interrogation, these warnings must be
repeated once custodial interrogation begins. Absent an effective waiver of these
rights, interrogation must cease."
96
In State v. Potter,97 Justice Cleckley held that
[a] defendant, in order to assert his or her right to counsel during
a police interrogation, must make some affirmative indication that
he or she desires to speak with an attorney or wishes to have
counsel appointed. Absent such an affirmative showing by the
defendant, the right to counsel is deemed waived.9"
Potter also found that
[w]hen a suspect willingly goes to the police station for
questioning at the request of the investigating officer, and the
suspect responds that he or she wishes to give a statement despite
the officer's warnings regarding the severity of the allegations
against the suspect, such statement is admissible as d voluntary
confession, unless the suspect can show that he or she was in
custody or that the statement was not voluntary.9
94 Id. at Syl. PL 7.
95 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
96 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
97 478 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1996).
98 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
99 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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In State v. Derr,"° the issue of changing venue was addressed. The specific
question involved a trial court's analysis of whether a change of venue is
appropriate due to the prior media coverage of a case. Justice Cleckley ruled that
"[o]ne of the inquiries on a motion for a change of venue should not be whether the
community remembered or heard the facts of the case, but whether the jurors had
such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt or innocence of
the defendant."''
C. Automobile Stop
In State v. Stuart," the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was
concerned with the extent to which law enforcement agents would be permitted to
make investigatory stops of automobiles. Justice Cleckley fashioned a reasonable
suspicion standard. The opinion stated that "[p]olice officers may stop a vehicle to
investigate if they have an articulable reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is
subject to seizure or a person in the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a crime. To the extent State v. Meadows holds otherwise, it is
overruled."' 3
The opinion in Stuart also determined that "[a] police officer may rely upon
an anonymous call if subsequent police work or other facts support its reliability
and, thereby, it is sufficiently corroborated to justify the investigatory stop under
the reasonable-suspicion standard."" 4 Finally, Justice Cleckley advised trial courts
that "[w]hen evaluating whether or not particular facts establish reasonable
suspicion, one must examine the totality of the circumstances, which includes both
the quantity and quality of the information known by the police."' 5
100 451 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1994).
101 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
102 452 S.E.2d 886 (W. Va. 1994).
103 Id. at Syl. Pt. I (citation omitted).
104 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
105 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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D. Jury Questions During Deliberation
A definitive statement on the procedure to be followed by trial courts in
responding to questions propounded by juries during deliberations was set out in
State v. Allen."° State v. Allen held, "[t]he proper method of responding to a written
jury inquiry during the deliberations period in a criminal case, as we stated in State
v. Smith is for the judge to reconvene the jury and to give further instructions, if
necessary, in the presence of the defendant and counsel in the courtroom.' °7
E. Discovery Violations
The decision in State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill"8 set out principles to guide trial
courts in addressing discovery violations. The opinion held that "[iln exercising
discretion pursuant to Rule 16(d)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a circuit court is not required to find actual prejudice to be justified in
sanctioning a party for pretrial discovery violations. Prejudice may be presumed
from repeated discovery violations necessitating numerous continuances and
delays."'0 9 The decision stated, "[a] circuit court may choose dismissal for
egregious and repeated violations where lesser sanctions such as a continuance
would be disruptive to the administration of justice or where the lesser sanctions
cannot provide the same degree of assurance that the prejudice to the defendant will
be dissipated.""'
F. Indictment
Justice Cleckley took the opportunity in State v. Adams"' to loosen the rigid
formality surrounding the altering of an indictment:
To the extent that State v. McGraw stands for the proposition that
"any" change to an indictment, whether it be form or substance,
106 455 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1994).
107 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3 (citation omitted).
108 454 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1994).
109 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
11o Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
111 456 S.E.2d 4 (W. Va. 1995).
Special]
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requires resubmission to the grand jury for its approval, it is hereby
expressly modified. An indictment may be amended by the circuit
court, provided the amendment is not substantial, is sufficiently
definite and certain, does not take the defendant by surprise, and
any evidence the defendant had before the amendment is equally
available after the amendment.
112
Adams made clear that the wholesale altering of an indictment by a circuit court was
not permitted. The opinion drew a bright line in holding that
[a]ny substantial amendment, direct or indirect, of an indictment
must be resubmitted to the grand jury. An 'amendment of form'
which does not require resubmission of an indictment to the grand
jury occurs when the defendant is not misled in any sense, is not
subjected to any added burden of proof, and is not otherwise
prejudiced."'
G. Plea Agreement
The case of State v. Sugg"4 provided Justice Cleckley the opportunity to
clarify the type of discussion permitted by a trial court in reviewing a plea
agreement. State v. Sugg said, "Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that a judge explore a plea agreement once disclosed in open
court; however, it does not license discussion of a hypothetical agreement that he
may prefer.""
' I5
The focus in State ex rel. Brewer v. Starcher"6 involved several concerns
when entering a plea agreement. Justice Cleckley noted at the outset that "[t]here
is no absolute right under either the West Virginia or the United States
Constitutions to plea bargain. Therefore, a circuit court does not have to accept
every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to
112 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
113 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
114 456 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995).
115 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
116 465 S.E.2d 185 (W. Va. 1995).
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plead.""1 7 The opinion further held that
[a]lthough the parties in criminal proceedings have broad
discretion in negotiating the terms and conditions of a plea
agreement, this discretion must be permissible under the West
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. Similarly, the decision
whether to accept or reject a plea agreement is vested almost
exclusively with the circuit court.'
Brewer also discussed the authority of the trial court in a Type C binding
plea agreement:
Once a circuit court unconditionally accepts on the record a plea
agreement under Rule 1 l(e)(1)(C) of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the circuit court is without authority to vacate
the plea and order reinstatement of the original charge.
Furthermore, after a defendant is sentenced on the record in open
court, unilateral modification of the sentencing decision by the
circuit court is not an option contemplated within Rule
11(e)(1)(C)." 9
Justice Cleckley also stated that "[a] circuit court has no authority to vacate or
modify, sua sponte, a validly accepted guilty plea under Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure because of subsequent events that do
not impugn the validity of the original plea agreement.'
12
The opinion in Brewer also examined issues involving the allegations of a
breach of a plea agreement. Justice Cleckley specifically addressed the issue of
fraud in plea negotiations:
If proven, a charge of fraud or misrepresentation poses a serious
threat to the integrity of judicial proceedings. Therefore, the
"fraud exception" is adopted as a necessary rule to enhance the
administration of justice. This exception is aimed at penalizing
117 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
118 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
119 Id. at Syl. Pt 4.
120 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
Special]
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deceitful behavior engaged in during the negotiating of a plea
agreement in its presentation to the court, or in its execution by the
defendant.'
2'
The opinion stated that "[t]here are two possible remedies for a broken plea
agreement-specific performance of the plea agreement or permitting the defendant
to withdraw his plea. A major factor in choosing the appropriate remedy is the
prejudice caused to the defendant."'" Brewer concluded with a statement regarding
the harmless error provision in Rule 11:
As provided by Rule 1 1(h) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a violation of Rule 11 does not necessarily require
automatic reversal or vacatur. Rather, when a defendant claims
that a circuit court failed to comply with Rule 11, a
straightforward, two-step harmless error analysis must be
conducted: (1) Did the circuit court in fact vary from the
procedures required by Rule 11, and (2) if so, did such variance
affect substantial rights of the defendant?"
H. Subpoena
The issue of an improperly issued subpoena was addressed in State ex rel.
Doe v. Troisi.24 Writing for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice
Cleckley held that "[i]f it is apparent that a subpoena was issued for improper
reasons, a circuit court has the discretion and inherent authority to require a
prosecutor to make a preliminary showing of relevance and the inability to obtain
the disputed material from another source."''"
L Closing Arguments
Justice Cleckley discussed remarks by counsel during closing argument in
121 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
122 State ex rel. Brewer, 465 S.E.2d at 189 Syl. Pt. 8.
123 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
124 459 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1995).
125 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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State v. Guthrie. '26 The opinion held initially that "[o]utside the context of cases
involving a recommendation of mercy, it is improper for either party to refer to the
sentencing possibilities of the trial court should certain verdicts be found or to refer
to the ability of the trial court to place a defendant on probation."'27 Justice
Cleckley went on to hold,
[t]he jury's sole function in a criminal case is to pass on whether
a defendant is guilty as charged based on the evidence presented at
trial and the law as given by the jury instructions. The applicable
punishments for the lesser-included offenses are not elements of
the crime; therefore, the question of what punishment a defendant
could receive if convicted is not a proper matter for closing
argument. To the extent the decision in State v. Myers is
inconsistent with our holding, it is expressly overruled.'
Justice Cleckley addressed the issue of improper comments by a prosecutor
during closing argument in State v. Sugg 29 Justice Cleckley wrote that "[a]
judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by
a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result
in manifest injustice.""13 The opinion identified factors to be considered in
evaluating the harm done by improper prosecutorial comments:
Four factors are taken into account in determining whether
improper prosecutorial comment is so damaging as to require
reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a
tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2)
whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the
remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish
the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were
deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous
126 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
127 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
128 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8 (citation omitted).
129 456 S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1995).
130 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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The case of State v. Roy 32 allowed Justice Cleckley to establish principles
involving criminal discovery of confidential information. The opinion noted that
"Rule 16(a)(1)(D) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
discovery of all results or reports of physical or mental examinations which are
material to the defense or are to be used as evidence in the prosecution's
case-in-chief.' 3 The opinion then reviewed policy considerations justifying the
protection of certain information from general disclosure:
The public policy consideration which underlies the statutes
preventing disclosure of confidential information held by
counselors, social workers, psychologists, and/or psychiatrists is to
enhance communications and effective treatment and diagnosis by
protecting the patient/client from the embarrassment and
humiliation that might be caused by the disclosure of information
imparted during the course of consultation. Considering the
existence and strength of these protections established by the
Legislature, the only issue left for a trial court is whether a
criminal defendant is entitled to judicial inspection of
confidentially protected communications in camera and thereafter
to their release if the inspection indicates their relevancy.'34
Roy concluded by listing the factors that must be established to allow an in camera
inspection of confidential information:
Before any in camera inspection of statutorily protected
communications can be justified, a defendant must show both
relevancy and a legitimate need for access to the communications.
This preliminary showing is not met by bald and unilluminating
allegations that the protected communications could be relevant or
131 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
132 460 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1995).
133 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
134 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
[Vol. I00:
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that the very circumstances of the communications indicate they
are likely to be relevant or material to the case. Similarly, an
assertion that inspection of the communications is needed only for
a possible attack on credibility is also rejected. On the other hand,
if a defendant can establish by credible evidence that the protected
communications are likely to be useful to his defense, the trial
judge should review the communications in camera."'
The issue of discovery was again addressed in State v. Crabtree. 3 6 In that
opinion Justice Cleckley held,
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that upon the request of the defendant the State shall
permit the defendant to inspect tangible objects that are material to
the preparation of the defendant's defense. The right of inspection
under this rule includes the right to have the defendant's own
expert examine the tangible evidence that the State contends was
used or possessed by the defendant at the time of the commission
of the crime.'
Crabtree further stated,
[a] criminal defendant who desires to analyze an article or
substance in the possession or control of the State under Rule 16
of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure should file a
motion setting forth the circumstances of the proposed analysis, the
identity of the expert who will conduct such analysis, and the
expert's qualifications and scientific background. The trial coirt
may then, in its discretion, provide for appropriate safeguards,
including, where necessary, the performance of such tests at the
State laboratory under the supervision of the State's analyst."'
135 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
136 482 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1996).
137 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
138 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
Special]
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K Search Warrant
The case of State v. Lacy"" provided some discussion regarding search
warrants:
A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things or persons to be seized. In determining
whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a
circuit court must inquire whether an executing officer reading the
description in the warrant would reasonably know what items are
to be seized. In circumstances where detailed particularity is
impossible, generic language is permissible if it particularizes the
types of items to be seized. When a warrant is the authority for the
search, the executing officer must act within the confines of the
warrant.140
The opinion cautioned that "[p]olice may not use an initially lawful search as a
pretext and means to conduct a broad warrantless search."'
4'
L. Jury Instructions
In State v. Guthrie,14 1 the court ruled that
[t]here should be only one standard of proof in criminal cases and
that is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Once a proper instruction
is given advising the jury as to the State's heavy burden under the
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt standard, an additional instruction
on circumstantial evidence is no longer required even if the State
relies wholly on circumstantial evidence.1
4 1
139 468 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1996).
140 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
141 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
142 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
143 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
[Vol. 100:
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In State v. Miller,"4 a specific type ofjury instruction was addressed:
In instructing ajury as to the inference of malice, a trial court must
prohibit the jury from finding any inference of malice from the use
of a weapon until the jury is satisfied that the defendant did in fact
use a deadly weapon. If the jury believes, however, there was legal
justification, excuse, or provocation, the inference of malice does
not arise and malice must be established beyond a reasonable doubt
independently without the aid of the inference. If requested by a
defendant, the trial court must instruct the jury that the defendant
has no obligation to offer evidence on the subject and the jury may
not draw any inference from the defendant's silence. 45
M Selecting a Jury
In State v. Phillips' 4 Justice Cleckley wrote about the use of peremptory
strikes by a defendant to remove a juror that should have been removed for cause
by the trial court. The opinion held,
[t]he language of W. Va. Code, 62-3-3 (1949), grants a defendant
the specific right to reserve his or her peremptory challenges until
an unbiased jury panel is assembled. Consequently, if a defendant
validly challenges a prospective juror for cause and the trial court
fails to remove the juror, reversible error results even if a
defendant subsequently uses his peremptory challenge to correct
the trial court's error.
47
Justice Cleckley identified the test for jury bias in State v. Miller:4 '
The relevant test for determining whether a juror is biased is
whether the juror had such a fixed opinion that he or she could not
judge impartially the guilt of the defendant. Even though a juror
144 476 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va. 1996).
145 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
146 461 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1995).
147 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
148 476 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va. 1996).
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swears that he or she could set aside any opinion he or she might
hold and decide the case on the evidence, ajuror's protestation of
impartiality should not be credited if the other facts in the record
indicate to the contrary.'4 9
State v. Miller also stated that "[a]ctual bias can be shown either by a juror's own
admission of bias or by proof of specific facts which show the juror has such
prejudice or connection with the parties at trial that bias is presumed."'"5 Miller
concluded by holding,
[t]he challenging party bears the burden of persuading the trial
court that the juror is partial and subject to being excused for
cause. An appellate court only should interfere with a trial court's
discretionary ruling on a juror's qualification to serve because of
bias only when it is left with a clear and definite impression that a
prospective juror would be unable faithfully and impartially to
apply the law.'
N. Warrantless Search of Premises
The case of State v. Lacy'52 set forth guidelines for a warrantless search of
a premise:
Law enforcement officials may interfere with an individual's
Fourth Amendment interests with less than probable cause and
without a warrant if the intrusion is only minimal and is justified
for law enforcement purposes. To determine whether the intrusion
complained of was minimal, a circuit court must examine
separately the interests implicated when the police feel a search for
weapons is necessary to keep the premises safe during the search
and the privacy interests of the defendant to be free of an
unreasonable search and seizure of his or her residence. Only when
law enforcement officers face a circumstance, such as a need to
149 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
150 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
151 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
152 468 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1996).
[Vol. 100:
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protect the safety of those on the premises, and a reasonable belief
that links the sought after information with the perceived danger is
it constitutional to conduct a limited search of private premises
without a warrant."'
The opinion continued by holding,
[n]either a showing of exigent circumstances nor probable cause is
required to justify a protective sweep for weapons as long as a
two-part test is satisfied: An officer must show there are specific
articulable facts indicating danger and this suspicion of danger to
the officer or others must be reasonable. If these two elements are
satisfied, an officer is entitled to take protective precautions and
search in a limited fashion for weapons."
Justice Cleckley explained the focus of an inquiry into the reasonableness
of a police officer's conduct:
The existence of a reasonable belief should be analyzed from the
perspective of the police officers at the scene; an inquiring court
should not ask what the police could have done. but whether they
had, at the time, a reasonable belief that there was a need to act
without a warrant.
155
The opinion concluded with a statement on the meaning of protective search:
A protective search is defined as a quick and limited search of
premises for weapons once an officer has individualized suspicion
that a dangerous weapon is present and poses a threat to the
well-being of himself and others. This cursory visual inspection is
limited to the area where the suspected weapon could be contained
and must end once the weapon is found and secured.'56
153 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
154 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
155 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
156 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
Special]
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss5/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
0. Bifurcation of Trial and Sentence
Justice Cleckley broke tradition in State v. LaRock 7 when he held that "[a]
trial court has discretionary authority to bifurcate a trial and sentencing in any case
where a jury is required to make a finding as to mercy."'58 The opinion set out
guidelines for bifurcation:
The burden of persuasion is placed upon the shoulders of the party
moving for bifurcation. A trial judge may insist on an explanation
from the moving party as to why bifurcation is needed. If the
explanation reveals that the integrity of the adversarial process
which depends upon the truth-determining function of the trial
process would be harmed in a unitary trial, it would be entirely
consistent with a trial court's authority to grant the bifurcation
motion.' 59
Justice Cleckley went further by stating,
[a]lthough it virtually is impossible to outline all factors that
should be considered by the trial court, the court should consider
when a motion for bifurcation is made: (a) whether limiting
instructions to the jury would be effective; (b) whether a party
desires to introduce evidence solely for sentencing purposes but
not on the merits; (c) whether evidence would be admissible on
sentencing but would not be admissible on the merits or vice versa;
(d) whether either party can demonstrate unfair prejudice or
disadvantage by bifurcation; (e) whether a unitary trial would
cause the parties to forego introducing relevant evidence for
sentencing purposes; and (f) whether bifurcation unreasonably
would lengthen the trial. 6
157 470 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1996).
158 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
159 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
160 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
[Vol. 100:
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P. Retroactivity of Procedural Rule
In State v. Blake, 6' the specific issue of retroactivity relating to a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure was addressed:
The criteria to be used in deciding the retroactivity of new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure are: (a) the purpose to be
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards. Thus, a judicial decision in a criminal case is to be
given prospective application only if: (a) It established a new
principle of law; (b) its retroactive application would retard its
operation; and (c) its retroactive application would produce
inequitable results."
IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A. First Degree Murder
First degree murder was thoroughly discussed in State v. Guthrie." The
focus of that case was the elements of premeditation and deliberation. As a general
statement, Justice Cleckley held that "[a]lthough premeditation and deliberation are
not measured by any particular period of time, there must be some period between
the formation of the intent to kill and the actual killing, which indicates the killing
is by prior calculation and design. This means there must be an opportunity for
some reflection on the intention to kill after it is formed."'6" The opinion further
elaborated,
[i]n criminal cases where the State seeks a conviction of first
degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation, a trial
court should instruct the jury that murder in the first degree
consists of an intentional, deliberate, and premeditated killing
161 478 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1996).
162 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
163 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
'64 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
Special]
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss5/7
